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Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and
for the County of Bannock, Honorable Robert C. Naftz, presiding.

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When the Supreme Court reviews a grant of summary judgment, the Court must apply the
same standard of review used by the District court. A grant of summary judgment is proper when
"the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party who moves for summary judgment bears the
burden of proving the absence of an issue as to any material fact. The facts must be liberally
construed in favor of the non-moving party. Sec. Fin. Fund, LLC v. Thomason, 153 Idaho 343,
346, 282 P.3d 604, 607 (2012). Even though the lower court may reach the correct result by an
erroneous theory, this Court may affirm the order on the correct theory. Markel Int'! Ins. Co. v.

Erekson, 153 Idaho 107, 113, 279 P.3d 93, 99 (2012).
When reviewing the trial court's evidentiary rulings, this Court applies an abuse of
discretion standard. Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg. Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163-64, 45 P.3d 816,
819-20 (2002). If an error is found in the admission of evidence that does not affect the substantial
rights of the parties it will be disregarded. Hake v. DeLane, 117 Idaho 1058, 1065, 793 P.2d 1230,
1237 (1990) (citing I.R.E. 103; I.R.C.P. 61).

II.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Statement of the Case
This case deals with the application of the Idaho Tort Claims Act to state agencies who

care for the mentally ill. Specifically, whether the State of Idaho may be liable for acts of a person
who is discharged from its care due to budgetary constraints. Additionally, this case presents a
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question of whether the victim's rights laws, as outlined in the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code
§ 19-5306, provide a private cause of action against state agencies where those agencies have not
been a party to the criminal proceedings.

B.

Statement of Facts
The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare ("Department") sustained a $36 million

reduction from the 2009-2010 budget designated for mental health needs. (R. 108). Federal
matching funds were likewise reduced dramatically reducing the number of services the
Department could provide to Idaho citizens suffering from mental illness. (R. 100, 108). One
citizen removed from Department programs was Gerald Durk Simpson. (R. 102-103).
This case arises out of injuries sustained by Appellant, Ryan Mitchell, when he was shot
with a handgun wielded by Mr. Simpson. Mr. Simpson had received various mental health services
from time to time which were provide by the Department for much of his life. (R. 177, 467). Mr.
Simpson was released from the care of the Department on June 23, 2010. (R. 102, 111 ). Appellant
was shot on September 27, 2010 by Mr. Simpson. (R. 12, 111). Appellant then brought suit against
Mr. Simpson, the State of Idaho and Bannock County Idaho. (R. 10).
During the time frame preceding Mr. Simpson's release from State assistance, the Idaho
legislature decreased the Health and Welfare Budget. At this same time there was a resulting
decrease in Federal matching funds. (R. 108). In response to these decreases, the Department was
compelled by a lack of funds to initiate a policy to reduce the number of clients in adult mental
health programs. (R. 100, 105). Mr. Simpson was notified, by letter, on June 23, 2010 that he did
not meet the guidelines for eligibility in order to continue to receive services from the State. (R.
102). Through interdepartmental emails, Department employees noted that the decision to begin
reducing services was necessary in order to accommodate budget cut policies. (R. 106). There is
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no evidence in the record that would demonstrate that any employee of the department acted with
malice or criminal intent in terminating Mr. Simpson's services. In fact, the letter to Mr. Simpson
clearly shows this was not the case. (R. 106).
After Appellant had been shot and Mr. Simpson criminally charged, a civil petition was
filed by the Attorney General's office for guardianship of Mr. Simpson. (R. 168-171 ). The
proposed guardian was Mr. Simpson's sister. (R. 169). The public defender's office handling Mr.
Simpson's criminal defense was provided a copy of the petition. (R. 171).
Mr. Simpson was temporarily removed to State Hospital South for psychiatric evaluation
and restoration of competency regarding his ability to assist in his criminal defense. (172-174).
After three admissions to State Hospital South for restoration of competency, the Bonneville
County Magistrate Judge dismissed the criminal complaint. See (R. 172, 423-427). This civil case
followed.

C.

Proceedings Below.
This appeal was taken after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the State

ofldaho dismissing Counts I, II and V of Appellant's complaint. (R. 466). The summary judgment
was granted against Appellant's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief as well Appellant's
claims against the state for negligence. (R. 484). The claims against the other defendants in the
case below were disposed of before the time of summary judgment and as such are not at issue in
this appeal. (R. 79-84).

III.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

A.
Does the Idaho Tort Claims Act operate to preclude Appellant's claims against the
State of Idaho for negligence where a former recipient of the Department of Health and Welfare's
services caused Appellant's injuries?
B.
Do the victims' rights provisions in Idaho Code § 19-5306 and Article I, Section
22 of the Idaho Constitution grant causes of action for declaratory and injunctive relief and require
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the Attorney General's office to allow the victim of a crime to participate in guardianship
proceedings of an accused?
IV.

ARGUMENT

A.
The District Court Properly Held that the Idaho Tort Claims Act Provides the State
of Idaho with Immunity Under the Facts of this Case.

Idaho Code§ 6-901 et seq., which comprises the Tort Claims Act, "abrogates the doctrine
of sovereign immunity and renders a governmental entity liable for damages arising out of its
negligent acts or omissions." Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 458, 886 P.2d 330, 334
(1994). The Tort Claims Act also "preserves the traditional rule of immunity in certain specific
situations." Id. The district court properly applied the Tort Claims Act to the facts of the case
below. The district court granted summary judgment on the basis that the State was immune under
the discretionary function provision of the Tort Claims Act. (R. 483).
In Appellant's brief, he argues the District Court did not properly determine if the state
actions were planning or operational. Appellant's Opening Brief p. 5. The Appellant sites to
Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P12d 755 (1986) and Jones v. City of St. Maires, 111 Idaho

733, 727 P.2d 1161 (1986) in support of this proposition. The record before this Court does not
support Appellant's argument.
i.

The district court properly identified and applied the operational versus
discretionary test to the undisputed facts of this case.

The district court clearly understood the applicable law and applied it to the case. The court
below relied upon a similar line of cases as those cited by the Appellant. (R. 482). Specifically,
the court cited to Jones v. City of St. Maries, supra. (R. 483 ). There is not an issue of the district
court failing to identify or apply the proper standard as alleged by Appellant. Contrary to
Appellant's argument, the district court recognized the need to identify the nature of the conduct
at issue. The district court Stated "This Court must first look at the nature of the conduct to
determine whether it is discretionary." (R. 482).
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
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The district court specifically identified the complained of conduct as the release of Mr.
Simpson from the care of the State. (R. 483). The court clearly set forth its reasoning for reaching
its conclusion. The court held that, even after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
non-moving party, the affidavits and accompanying documents submitted by the State showed that
the budget reduction, of well in excess of $36 million, was the driving factor. (R. 483). The court
even provided specific examples citing to the evidence before it. (R. 484). The argument advanced
by Appellant, that the district court's approach to analyzing the evidence before it was improper,
is without merit.

ii.

Idaho Code § 6-904(1) provides immunity for the release of an individual in a
mental health program due to budget constraints.

Idaho Code § 6-904(1) provides immunity to the State for any claim which:
Arises out of any act or omission of an employee of the governmental
entity exercising ordinary care, in reliance upon the execution or
performance of a statutory or regulatory function, whether or not the
statue or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on
the part of a governmental entity thereof, whether or not the discretion
be abused.
LC. § 6-904(1).
In order to determine if the State action qualifies for discretionary function immunity the
Court must look at the nature of the conduct involved. Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484,488, 903
P.2d 73, 77 (1995). Routine matters cannot be deemed operational. However, decisions which
involve "financial, political, economic and social effects of a particular plan are likely
'discretionary."' Hunter v. Dep 't of Corr., 138 Idaho 44, 48, 57 P.3d 755, 759 (2002); See also

Lawton, 126 Idaho at 460, 886 P.2d at 336.
Applying the undisputed facts of this case to these standards clearly implicates
discretionary function immunity under LC. § 6-904(1). Affidavits submitted to the district court
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clearly show that $36 million was cut from the budget of the Department as well as loss of Federal
matching funds in the fiscal years of2009 and 2010. (R. 107-108).
Daniel Traughber, ACT Team Supervisor at the Department, circulated a memo in July
2010 explaining the process by which reductions in services were being accomplished. (R. 100).
Specifically, the memo deals with "selection of clients for closure" and states that "being
understaffed and underfunded in such a manner that continuing to operate without prioritizing
those with serious mental illness, and those without funding, was likely to lead to global
deterioration for all open clients." (R. 100). This memo is an objective statement that due to budget
constraints the department was required to set a policy to determine which recipients of their
services were truly qualified. In other words, as a result of budget cuts, a decision to serve a limited
number of clients had to be accomplished.
Reducing the number of clients was necessary in order to "prevent global deterioration for
all open clients." (R. 100). As the district court noted, the termination letter sent to Mr. Simpson
indicated that he may have benefited from treatment but that Mr. Simpson did not meet the criteria
for his services to remain open. (R. 102). These actions align directly with the financial and social
effect of a plan which implicate discretionary function. The decision to reduce the number of
clients the agency could serve was a broad policy decision and not merely operational activity. As
the interoffice memo indicates, this was a decision to serve a smaller number of clients adequately
or be left with the inability to serve any client adequately. (R. 100).
The instant case is distinguishable from Jones, cited by Appellant. The Appellant attempts
to stretch the Jones case beyond its practical effect. In large measure, the Jones opinion was
rendered because the trial court did not have the benefit of a recent opinion, at the time, announcing
the planning/operation test and the record before the Court was insufficient to determine what
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conduct was the focus of Plaintiffs' complaint. See Jones 111 Idaho at 736, 727 P.2d at 1164
(1986).
The Appellant argues that Jones requires a trial court to split a governmental entities duty
into subparts and therefore abrogate the discretionary function rule. This interpretation is not
logical nor is it supported by the case itself. The Jones case simply states that if a policy is made
to perform or not perform an act due to "budgetary concerns or other factors" a governmental
entity is immune "even if the decision is negligently made." Id. at 736-737, 727 P.2d at 1164-1165.
However, if a governmental entity has undertaken the responsibility to perform an action it must
do so without negligence. Id. at 737, 727 P.2d at 1165. The two-step analysis advocated by
Appellant is absent from the case. Jones describes two different scenarios not a two-part test.
In the present case, a decision was made to provide services to a reduced number of clients
at the Department due to budget cuts. (R. 100). It was determined that a certain number of clients
would have to be terminated regardless of whether they would benefit from the services provided.
(R. 100, 102). The decision to cut clients due to budget cuts is part of the same decision, not two
separate acts. The facts of this case fall within the first situation outlined in Jones.
In the present case, a governmental entity elected not to provide services beyond what it
could reasonably accomplish due to budget cuts and resulting staff restraints. The undisputed facts
in the current case do not present a situation where the department had undertaken a responsibility
and failed to perform. A policy decision was made to decrease the number of clients regardless of
whether the services would be beneficial. Under Jones, this decision must be deemed discretionary
and not operational. The district court clearly and correctly identified the governing principles and
applied them to the undisputed facts of this case.
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Subjecting the State to liability in this case would have the effect of making all State
agencies, who provide mental health services, liable when a client is released from services. The
State cannot be expected to serve all clients indefinitely, regardless of the agency's funding or the
client's level of need, qualifications for services, or financial resources. The Department has never
undertaken such a duty. This case presents the quintessential scenario in which discretionary
function immunity serves its intended purpose.
If this Court holds discretionary function immunity does not apply, the State is nonetheless

immune from the claims made in this case. LC. § 6-904(3) reserves immunity for claims which
"arise out of assault [or] battery .... " In the case before the Court, the complained of damages by
Appellant are for injuries he received from an aggravated battery. See (R. 12, 21-25). As such,
Appellant's claim is precluded by the Tort Claims Act under this provision as well. There is no
evidence that the State employees, acted with malice or criminal intent towards Mr. Mitchell, a
requisite element of LC. § 6-904.
iii.

The record is devoid of any evidence that the State was negligent or acted in a
manner outside the procedures set forth in the Traughber Memorandum.

Appellant's argument next turns to whether the State was negligent. Here again, the
Appellant attempts to apply a test that is not supported by law. For the reasons set forth above, it
is clear the State is entitled to immunity under the Tort Claims Act. Nevertheless, Appellant insists
on analyzing whether or not the State was negligent. A discussion of whether or not the State was
negligent is included in this brief only to respond to these arguments. The standard advocated by
Appellant simply does not apply.
The Appellant argues the processes advocated by Mr. Traughber in this memorandum, (R.
100), were not followed. In support of Appellant's argument he asserts there is "no evidence in the
record that any of the procedures" outlined in the memorandum were followed. Appellant's
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Opening Brief p. 11. Appellant misconstrues his burden in this respect. In a summary judgment
proceeding if the moving party challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case on the basis
that no genuine issue of material facts exists, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come
forward with evidence showing a genuine issue of fact for trial. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86,
90, 867 P.2d 960, 964 (1994). Here, Appellant is unable to cite to any evidence in the record
showing the State acted negligently.
Appellant cites to the record for the proposition that Mr. Simpson was a paranoid
schizophrenic, had received care from the State and that the State knew Mr. Simpson was
"medically non-compliant." Appellant's Opening Briefp. 11. The record is cited in support of this
proposition at pages 169, 177 and 182. The guardianship documents do set out Mr. Simpson's
diagnosis and care from the State. (R. 169). However, the interrogatory answers in the record
provide no support that the State knew Mr. Simpson was "medically non-compliant." (R. at 182).
These answers were provided in response to questions asking what services were provided to Mr.
Simpson. (R. at 182). Appellant's characterization of these answers is completely inaccurate.
Appellant further argues that the State knew Mr. Simpson had access to guns. Appellant's

Opening Briefp. 11 (citing R. 183, 190, 191, 179). Here again, Appellant misrepresents the state
of the record. Appellant is attempting to paint Mr. Simpson as a dangerous man who had guns.
The record shows that there were pictures taken of Mr. Simpson with a rifle. (R. 190-191 ).
These photos were taken in May of 2009, over a year before Mr. Simpson was terminated from
State assistance. (R. 102-103, 183). These documents tell us nothing about whether Mr. Simpson
had propensity for violence. Likewise, the discovery answers cited in support of Appellants
argument simply state that Mr. Simpson had been spotted with a rifle. However, ACT Team
members never saw any guns in Simpson's apartment. (R. 183).
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Documents maintained by the State show that Mr. Simpson had no violent history or
tendencies to violence and that he never exhibited aggressive behavior or vocalized any intended
hostilities before the incident with Appellant. (R. 179). Likewise, the letter submitted to Mr.
Simpson clearly states that he was the subject of an internal evaluation. (R. 102). This is clear
evidence that Mr. Simpson was an individual who was evaluated and identified as a client who
met the criteria under the policy to reduce the number of clients at the Department.
When the record is examined accurately, it becomes clear there is a lack of any evidence
the State failed to act with due care. As noted above, Mr. Simpson was nonviolent, he was
evaluated and was sent a letter outlining alternate resources and contact information. (R. 102-103,
179). Conspicuously absent from the record is any evidence that the State failed to follow the
Traughber process. If the standard of simple negligence is to be applied, which the State does not
concede, Appellant has failed to identify anything in the record that would tend to show the State
acted negligently. In fact, the records show just the opposite. (R. 100, 102-103, 179). 1
The Appellant contends this case is not a supervision case under LC. § 6-904A. See (Tr.
66-67). However, Appellant subsequently argues that due to the length of care and contact with
Mr. Simpson, the State had some ongoing obligation to supervise him after care and contact were
terminated. If such an argument is accepted, it would have the result of placing a higher burden on
the State when an individual it has contact with or custody of becomes unsupervised. It would
seem to be a strange result for the State to be granted immunity under LC. § 6-904A for individuals
in its custody but be held to a standard of due care for those it no longer has control over. Under
Appellant's logic, a Judge could be held to a negligence standard when he releases an accused on
their own recognizance or when unsupervised probation is ordered for a convicted criminal.

1 It should be noted that Appellant had the chance to request additional discove1y but abandoned his Rule 56(f) motion. (R. 466).
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Either the State had a duty to supervise Mr. Simpson or it did not. Appellant cannot have
it both ways. If such a duty existed, the state is immune under LC. § 6-904A.
In general, one does not have a duty to control the conduct of a third party. Bloom, 111
Idaho at 225, 723 P .2d at 7 59. However, if a special relationship exists a duty may be imposed. Id.
at 225, 723 P.2d at 759. In the absence of such a relationship no duty is owed to protect others
from harm caused by third persons. Id. "As the Restatement and Dean Prosser's observations both
indicate, the key to this duty is not the supervising individual's direct relationship with the
endangered person or persons, but rather it is the relationship to the supervised individual. The
duty extends to the protection and safety of 'others' foreseeably endangered." Id.
The State's right to control or monitor Mr. Simpson after his release was terminated as was
any legal responsibility for his actions. See Litchfield v. Nelson, 122 Idaho 416, 835 P.2d 651
(1992). In Litchfield, this Court upheld a jury verdict finding a county and county sheriff not liable
for the conduct of a released prisoner. The released prisoner was being held for driving under the
influence and was released on an order to allow him to attend impatient alcohol treatment. Id. at
418, 83 5 P .2d at 653. While the prisoner was traveling from the jail to the treatment facility he
operated his vehicle under the influence and collided with another vehicle. Id. The Court held that
the jury could find that the county was under no obligation to oversee the prisoner's transport and
that once he was released the special relationship was at an end. Id. at 421, 835 P.2d at 656.
Likewise, no special relationship is present in this case once Simpson is released from the mental
health program.
Unlike the Litchfield case, there is no conflicting evidence in this case. In the present case,
the State had offered Mr. Simpson enhanced services on multiple occasions but he had refused.
(R. 179). The services provided were largely for medication management. (R. 179). Even
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assuming, arguendo, medication management by the State established such a relationship, there
were no identifiable persons who were foreseeably endangered by Mr. Simpson at the time of this
release. Accordingly, Mr. Simpson's special relationship, if any, was terminated at the time of his
release from services.
As noted above, Mr. Simpson's records established that he "had no violent tendencies or a
history of violence." (R. 179). Mr. Simpson never spoke of hostilities towards others. (R. 179).
Likewise, the carrying of a rifle, as noted in the record, is consistent with many rural areas in Idaho
and Idaho allows a rifle to be openly carried in public. (R. 179). There was no indication at the
time Mr. Simpson was spotted with a rifle that he presented a danger to himself or others or that
he had illegally obtained the rifle. Furthermore, Appellant was injured when Mr. Simpson shot
him with a revolver. (R. 31

~

14).

It is Appellant's burden to produce evidence beyond the bare allegations in his complaint
to show there is a genuine issue for trial. Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e). The record contains nothing that
would indicate Mr. Simpson would engage in a violent act and that the State was on notice of such
a situation. As such, Appellant cannot point to a duty which was breached by the State. The record
contains no evidence that would create a genuine issue of fact in this respect. Clearly, even if the
case in analyzed under the standards urged by Appellant, summary judgment in nonetheless
warranted. 2

This Court is free to uphold the rnling of the District Coui1 on an alternative basis. lvfarkel Int'/ Ins. Co. v. Erekson, 153 Idaho l07, l 13,279
P.3d 93, 99 (2012).
2
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iv.

The District Court's ruling was based on admissible evidence.

Appellant next argues the district court erred in admitting evidence via affidavit discussing
budget cuts and offering departmental documents. Appellant admits that he relies on these
documents in his argument but urges this Court to disallow them for purposes of upholding the
ruling below. It would seem equity requires a different result.
These same arguments were raised at the time of hearing in the proceedings below. The
affidavits complained of are the affidavits of Jodi Osborn and Sue Chadwick. (R. 96-109). When
reviewing the trial court's evidentiary rulings, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard.

Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 163-164, 45 P.3d at 819-820. If an error is found in the admission of
evidence that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties it will be disregarded. Hake, 117
Idaho at 1065, 793 P.2d at 1237 (citing Idaho R. Evid. 103; Idaho R. Civ. P. 61).
In the current case it cannot be said that the district court abused its discretion in admitting
this evidence for purposes of summary judgment. The district court provided a thorough recitation
of the legal standards governing Appellant's objections to the affidavits. (R. 468-472).
As noted by the Court with respect to Ms. Osborn's affidavit, the affidavit states her
position with the state ofldaho and further identifies the amount of budget cuts to the Department.
(R. 107-108, 469). Ms. Osborn's affidavit establishes her knowledge and familiarity though her
position as Financial Executive Officer and identifies the years where budget cuts occurred. (R.
108). These years correspond with the year Mr. Simpson's services were terminated and thus
establish their relevance to the analysis under Idaho Code § 6-904(1 ). The documents attached to
Ms. Chadwick's affidavit further establish the relevance of the cuts as they are specifically
discussed in departmental documents. Contrary to Appellant's assertions, there is no requirement
that Ms. Osborn be employed at the time the cuts were made but only that she has knowledge of
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them. Likewise, it is difficult to see how admission of this evidence adversely affects the rights of
Appellant. As such, the district court's ruling should be upheld.
Similar to Ms. Osborn's affidavit, the affidavit of Sue Chadwick was properly ruled on by
the district court. Ms. Chadwick clearly states the affidavit is made upon her personal knowledge.
(R. 97). Ms. Chadwick's affidavit goes on to establish the attached documents are created in the

normal course of business, the documents are true and correct copies and that as Office Supervisor
she is personally familiar with the types of documents maintained by the department. (R. 97).
Appellant's argument quibbles over the specific language used in the affidavit.
The Chadwick affidavit clearly indicates the documents were "maintained in the normal
course of business." (R. 97). This phrase encompasses all of Appellant's concerns. The fact they
were maintained in the normal course of business clearly indicates that they were not made in
anticipation of litigation and that they are documents produced and maintained in the ordinary
course of business. The attached documents clearly show they were created at or near the time.
The difference in language used does not impact the fact that the documents are admissible under
I.R.E. 803(6). Here again it is difficult to see how the Appellant's rights were adversely affected
by the admission of these documents as Appellant relied upon them at the time of summary
judgment and in his appeal to this Court. 3
Clearly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence at the time
of summary judgment. Accordingly, the ruling below should be upheld.

3 These affidavits also fall under Idaho R. Evid. 803(24 ). The affidavits and documents are offered as evidence of a material fact, the statement
and records are more probative on the issues in this case than any evidence because there are no like records and the interests of justice of both
patties are served by their admission.
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B.

The Appellant's Claims under the Idaho's Victims' Rights Laws Were Properly
Dismissed.
The Appellant next argues the district court erred in dismissing his claims under the

constitutional and statutory provisions granting certain rights to victims of crime. Addressing these
arguments requires a two part analysis. First, it must be determined whether the victims' rights
provisions provide for the relief sought by Appellant. Second, if such remedies are available, it
must be determined whether the State engaged in any action that could be construed as implicating
the rights announced in the victims' rights provisions.

i.

The victims' rights provisions contained in the Idaho Code and the Idaho
Constitution do not provide Appellant a remedy.

LC.§ 19-5306(4) provides in part:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize a court to dismiss
a case, to set aside or void a finding of guilt or the acceptance of a plea
of guilty .. . nor be construed as creating a cause of action for money
damages, costs or attorney's fees against the state, a county, a
municipality, any agency, instrumentality or person ....
LC.§ 19-5306(4) (emphasis supplied).
Clearly, no cause of action is granted due to a violation of the victims' rights provisions of
LC. § 19-5306. As such, any claims made by Plaintiff in this regard fail as a matter oflaw. Article
1 § 22 of the Idaho State Constitution also deals with victims' rights. Similar to the statutory
provisions above, the Constitution also disallows actions for money damages, cost or attorney fees
relating to violation of the victims' rights provisions. See Idaho Const. Art. 1 § 22. In fact, the
provision dealing with civil liability is identical to the provision in LC. § 19-5306 cited above. See

id.
At the outset, it must be noted the Idaho Code chapter cited by Appellant in support of his
argument to allow declaratory relief under the victims' rights laws specifically deals with the issue
of costs. LC. § 10-1210 states "In any proceeding under this act the court make such award of costs
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as may seem equitable and just." On its face, a lawsuit brought seeking declaratory relief is a case
in which costs may be awarded. As such, this action is specifically prohibited under the plain
language of LC. § 19-5306 and Article 1 § 22 of the Idaho Constitution.
Likewise, under the Rules of Civil Procedure, costs are allowed as a matter of right to the
prevailing party in a civil action unless otherwise ordered by the Court. Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l).
As such, the claim for injunctive relief would be subject to costs making it too run afoul of the
limitations in the victims' rights laws.
The statute does not define "costs." However, giving this term its regular meaning and use
in legal actions, this term refers to costs of suit. In both declaratory and injunctive relief costs are
at issue. As such, on this basis alone, the relief sought by Appellant is disallowed.
The Appellant ignores this issue and focuses on whether actions for declaratory relief and
injunction are authorized by the Idaho Constitution or legislative provisions. Appellant argues that
because the constitutional clause is self-executing it provides him will all remedies to enforce it
not specifically exempted in its language. There is no dispute that the relief sought by Appellant
is absent from both the constitutional and statutory provisions.
There are no reported cases in Idaho dealing with this specific issue under the Victims'
Rights Act or related constitutional provisions. Many other jurisdictions have dealt with the issues
of equitable relief such as through a writ of mandamus. However, these vast majority of cases
appear to deal only with a victim's right to file for relief inside the criminal action. See State v.
Lamberton, 183 Ariz. 47, 899 P.2d 939 (1995); People v. Superior Court (Thompson), 154 Cal.
App. 3d 319, 202 Cal. Rptr. 585 (2d Dist. 1984). The State is unable to find any case law
specifically on point with the facts of this case.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 16

The constitutional provision at issue states "[t]his section shall be self-enacting." Idaho
Const. Article 1 § 22. However, the provision fails to identify any mechanism of enforcement. "A
constitutional provision may be said to be self-executing if it supplies a sufficient rule by means
of which the right given may be enjoyed and protected, or the duty imposed may be enforced; and
it is not self-executing when it merely indicates principles, without laying down rules by means of
which those principles may be given the force of law. In short, if complete in itself, it executes
itself." Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399,403, 21 S. Ct. 210,212, 45 L. Ed. 249 (1900). A constitutional
provision may be expressed in mandatory terms and still not be self-executing. See 16 Am. Jur.
2d. Constitutional Law § 98 at 486 (1998). It would appear the provision at issue is not selfexecuting.
The Appellant argues it was error for the district Court to rely on State ex. Rel Lamm v.

Nebraska Bd. Of Pardons, 260 Neb. 1000, 620 N.W.2d 736 (2001), because the Nebraska
provisions contains language which states "[t]he legislature shall provide by law for the
implementation of the rights granted in this section." Id. at 768. While the Idaho provision states
it is self-enacting it leaves to the legislature to "define, implement, preserve, and expand the rights
guaranteed to victims." Idaho Const. Article 1 § 22. There is little functional difference between
the two. It is interesting to note that the constitutional provision was not added until after the
statutory provision had been the law for nine years. See 1985 Idaho Sess. Laws 299-300.
The Idaho provision on its face, similar to the Nebraska provision, provides no mechanism
by which it may be enforced. As such, the power granted to the legislature is the sole means by
which such a mechanism may be created. However, the accompanying statutory provisions, aside
from definitions, provide no further means of enforcement or clarification. See I.C. § 19-5306.
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There is no mention of declaratory or injunctive relief in either the statutory or
constitutional provision. To read an unannounced cause of action into these provisions would
usurp the role of the legislature. The legislature has changed the provision limiting suit through
various amendments of this statute. Originally, the law stated that civil liability would not be
allowed for the failure to comply with the statute if such failure was caused by a governmental
entity. See 1985 Idaho Sess. Laws 299-300. This provision was later deleted and replaced with the
current version of subsection four which prohibits any action with respect to money damages, costs
or attorney fees. See 1995 Idaho Sess. Laws 142. The constitutional provision was not added until
1994. See 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws 1498.
Clearly the intent of the legislature was to avoid collateral lawsuits dealing with the
victims' rights provisions. This argument is bolstered by the fact that criminal cases may not be
reversed or dismissed based upon the failure to comply with the law. LC. § 19-5306(4). Even if
the victim feels a dismissal, sentence or plea is not adequate, the law provides them no remedy.
Presumably, if the Court accepted Appellant's argument, a "wronged" victim could seek
declaratory or injunctive relief regarding a criminal sentence the victim thought was inadequate.
Actions for injunctive and declaratory relief have not been authorized under the Idaho Code
or Constitution. Had the legislature intended to "expand" the protections under the law as
authorized by the constitutional amendment, it would have so stated. The victims' rights laws aim
to severely limit what actions may be brought in the civil arena. If there is a policy basis for
expanding remedies under the law, that consideration must be left for the legislature. State AFLCIO v. Leroy, 110 Idaho 691,698,718 P.2d 1129, 1136 (1986) ("In the absence ofa legislative
invasion of constitutionally protected rights, the judicial branch of government must respect and
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defer to the legislature's exclusive policy decisions"). Clearly, no cause of action for injunctive or
declaratory relief is allowed under the victims' rights laws.

ii.

The record contains no evidence which would tend to show that the State
violated the victims' rights laws.

If this Court holds the victims' rights laws do allow for petitions for declaratory judgment
and injunctive relief, the judgment entered by the court below should nonetheless be affirmed. The
grant of summary judgment was proper because Appellant cannot identify any way in which the
State violated the victims' right laws.
The complained of conduct regarding the State ofldaho has nothing to do with the criminal
action in which Mr. Simpson was charged. The criminal proceeding was prosecuted by Bonneville
County. (R. 194-195). As such, any impropriety in those proceedings is the responsibility of the
County and not the State. This appears to have been conceded by the County when it stipulated to
judgment. (R. 79-84). Appellant's dispute with the County has been resolved though a consent
decree. As such, any issues with respect to notification of proceedings in the criminal matter and
its dismissal are issues that are solely within the control of the County.
Appellant's complaint against the State of Idaho appears to be over a guardianship
proceeding initiated by the Attorney General's office on behalf of Mr. Simpson. Appellant claims
this was part of the "Attorney General's office secret plan to release Simpson." (R. 17). However,
nothing in the records supports this allegation. Additionally, there is nothing in the victims' rights
act that would necessitate notice to Appellant of the guardianship proceeding.
Presumably, Appellant makes his claim against the State based upon I.C. § 19-5306(1) (b ),
(d)-( e ). These sections allow for a crime victim to be present at criminal justice proceedings and,
"upon request", access to information about the release of a defendant and "upon request" to be
heard "at all criminal justice proceedings" dealing with the release of the defendant. See I.C. § 19-
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5306(1 )(b), ( d)-( e). These statutes do not provide any rights to Appellant with regard to the State's
action in this case. The State's action with respect to Mr. Simpson was limited to the guardianship
proceeding.
The actions of the Attorney General's office in initiating guardianship proceedings do not
fall under either of these categories. A guardianship proceeding is not a criminal justice proceeding
but a civil proceeding. See LC.§ 15-5-101 et. seq; (R. 168). Likewise, there is no evidence in the
record which would suggest that the State initiated this proceeding to secure Mr. Simpson's
release. (R. 168-171 ). The situation imagined by the Appellant simply did not exist.
There is no evidence in the record, other than bare allegations in an unverified complaint,
that Appellant made a formal request for information about Mr. Simpson's release to the Court
presiding over the criminal charges. See (R. 18). The provisions at issue do not grant Appellant
the right to request this information other than inside a criminal proceeding. Likewise, nothing in
I.C. § 19-5306 provides Appellant the right to know the specific location of Mr. Simpson.
Under the facts of this case, the provisions of LC. § 19-5306 do not apply. Accordingly,
even if the victims' rights laws allow for injunctive or declaratory relief, there is no factual basis
for such claims in this case. As such, the district court's ruling should be affirmed.

V.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Appellant cannot establish a genuine issue of fact to be tried in this case.
Accordingly, the district court's ruling on summary judgment should be affirmed under the theory
announced by that court or be affirmed upon the alternative principles of law discussed above.
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